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ABSTRACT
The basic principles of Indian-law jurisprudence often appear disconnected with basic principles of
American constitutional law. Indian law, however, has a special significance to important issues
of state and federal power. This Article seeks to build on the work of prior scholars who have
sought to connect Indian law to American constitutional values.
Public Law 280 is a federal law that gives states control over certain aspects of Indian affairs that
were traditionally within the scope of the federal government. This Article argues that Public Law
280 is unconstitutional under a doctrine of constitutional preemption. Constitutional preemption
is grounded in the system of overlapping sovereignty that forms the structure of the Constitution
and should be understood as prohibiting the federal government from delegating inherently and
exclusively federal powers to the states. The power to manage Indian affairs is entrusted
exclusively to the federal government, and Congress cannot constitutionally delegate it to the states.
The constitutional difficulties raised by Public Law 280 are particularly relevant in an era when
issues of federalism are at the forefront of legal discussion. It is often accepted that courts may
limit the federal government’s authority to exercise powers reserved to the states, but we should also
take seriously the idea that courts may limit the states’ authority to exercise powers reserved to the
federal government.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no area of law raises more profound constitutional ques1
tions than federal Indian law. The nature of sovereignty, sovereign
2
3
immunity, the legal status of states, the distribution of power be4
tween state, federal, and tribal governments, and the scope of indi-

1

2

3

4

See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218–26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the tensions within Indian-law jurisprudence pertaining to the sovereign status of
tribes).
See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919) (explaining how the Creek Nation was a sovereign tribe and was “free from liability for injuries to persons or property
due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace”).
See Frank W. DiCastri, Are All States Really Equal? The “Equal Footing” Doctrine and Indian
Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (1997) (describing states’ argument that recognizing Indian tribes’ claims to specific lands will lead to some states having less territorial sovereignty than others).
See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (“This case requires
us once again to reconcile the plenary power of the States over residents within their
borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations.”).
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vidual civil rights5 are just a handful of the issues that permeate Indian-law jurisprudence. Yet, the major doctrines of Indian law often
appear hermetically sealed off from familiar constitutional principles.
Courts have struggled to ground federal Indian law in constitutional
6
text. Common themes in Indian law such as plenary power, the
ward-guardian relationship, treaty abrogation, and tribal sovereignty
7
that exist “only at the sufferance of Congress” bear no apparent relationship to the core principles of constitutional law. Some scholars
have tried to “reinterpret[] the sources of federal Indian law to be
8
more consistent with our general political and ideological heritage.”
This approach sheds light on how current Indian-law jurisprudence is
inconsistent with our political traditions. In doing so, it also provides
groundwork for more effective legal arguments by binding Indian law
to basic principles of constitutional law.
Building on these scholars’ approach, this Article argues that Public Law 280 (“PL-280”) is an unconstitutional delegation of an inherently federal power to the states. PL-280, enacted into law in 1953,
sought to assimilate Native Americans into state political systems by
granting states extensive power over Indian tribes, including jurisdic9
tion over crimes and civil disputes. Although PL-280 raises a number
5

6

7
8

9

See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (interpreting the scope of the
Indian Civil Rights Act in the context of claims made against a tribe for discriminating
based on sex and ancestry); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (refusing to apply
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment to Indian tribes).
The Supreme Court made this point with its rather understated acknowledgment that
“[t]he source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.7. See also Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that precedent holding that Congress has the power to control the “the
metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty” is not rooted in the Constitution (citation omitted)); David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Explication of “Federal Plenary Power:” An
Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886–1914, 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349, 349
(1994) (“A central feature of this dynamic dialogue [between American Indian tribes and
the United States] is the incongruous relationship between the United States Congress’s
exercise of plenary power and the tribes’ efforts to exercise their sovereign political
rights.”).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 275 (1980). See also Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115 (2002) (“This essay challenges the federal government and, most notably, the federal judiciary, to honor American legal traditions by abiding by the nation’s own founding principles with respect to the nation’s first
people.”); Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between
the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L.
REV. 617, 618 (1994) (applying constitutional principles of federalism to the federal-tribal
relationship).
PL-280 was enacted as part of a general termination policy, during which Congress terminated many tribes as political and legal entities, causing them to lose not only their
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of constitutional questions, this Article focuses on one narrow issue:
whether the powers that PL-280 grants to states are so inherently federal that they cannot be exercised by the states constitutionally. The
small body of case law addressing the constitutionality of PL-280 is
10
premised on the idea that those powers are not inherently federal —
this Article argues that they are.
In arguing that PL-280 is unconstitutional, this Article also uses
PL-280 to illustrate how Indian-law jurisprudence needs to be reconciled with our basic constitutional principles. This Article argues that
the Constitution embodies a particular scheme of popular sovereignty and that federalism is an integral part of that scheme. PL-280
demonstrates how these principles are undermined when Congress
delegates to states powers that the people placed in the federal government’s exclusive control. Accordingly, just as judicial protection
of federalism is appropriate when the federal government exceeds its
constitutional authority; judicial protection of federalism is appropriate where the federal government inappropriately delegates its constitutional authority to the states.
Part I of this Article lays out some of the basic principles of Indian
law prior to the passage of PL-280 and surveys the case law addressing
the constitutionality of PL-280. Part II argues that the power to manage Indian affairs is constitutionally preempted and that states are
precluded from exercising it even if expressly authorized to do so by
Congress. Part III argues that because the power over Indian affairs
is constitutionally preempted, PL-280 is also an unconstitutional delegation of federal authority. This Article concludes that PL-280 offers valuable insight into the relationship between Indian law and
federalism.
I. BACKGROUND
The passage of PL-280 fundamentally changed the power relationships between states, tribes, and the federal government. This Part
briefly highlights how this change developed. First, it discusses the
general principles of Indian law to provide context for the passage of
PL-280 in 1953. Second, it looks at the passage of PL-280 and exam-

10

sovereign status but also their federal trust relationship. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric
R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 150–54 (1977)
(listing the tribes terminated in the middle of the twentieth century and discussing the effects of termination on those tribes).
See infra text accompanying notes 45–69.
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ines how courts have interpreted, limited, and addressed the constitutionality of PL-280.
A. Federal and State Authority over Indian Affairs Prior to the Passage of PL280
Indian law has traditionally been based on the principle that Indian tribes are “distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil,
11
Accordingly, tribes retain the inherent
from time immemorial.”
12
powers that naturally accompany their status as sovereigns. Inherent
sovereignty extends to aspects of the tribe’s internal affairs, but is lim13
ited by “the tribe’s dependent status.” Thus, courts have held that,
although tribes are sovereigns, they have naturally lost some of their
14
sovereignty by coming within the power of the United States.
In accordance with these general principles of sovereignty, states
have traditionally exercised little authority over tribal affairs. The
seminal statement of this limitation on state authority is in Worcester v.
15
Georgia, in which the Supreme Court overturned Georgia’s conviction of two citizens for residing on Cherokee lands without a license.
The Court described the Cherokee tribe as “a distinct communi16
ty . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”
The traditional view set out in Worcester has since shifted. Today,
courts generally view Indian law as a question of federal preemption,
in which the degree of state power over on-reservation activity depends on whether federal law, including treaties and statutes, pre17
Following the modern idea of preemption,
cludes state action.
courts have relaxed their restrictions on state power over onreservation activity. States may now prosecute non-Indians for crimes

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
See Nat’l Farmers Credit Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851
(1985) (“The tribes also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing political
communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America.”).
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425
(1989).
See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331 (1983) (“Indian tribes have
been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by virtue of their dependent status.”).
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 520.
See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“The modern cases
thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead
to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.”).
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committed against non-Indians on reservation lands.18 Similarly,
states may place taxes on transactions occurring on reservation lands
so long as the “legal incidence” of the tax does not fall on the tribe or
19
its members. Further, courts have held that states have “inherent
jurisdiction on reservations with regard to off-reservation violations of
20
state law.” But, while the basis for the rule has shifted, the general
rule remains that states lack authority over tribal affairs unless author21
ized by federal statute.
In contrast to the limited jurisdiction courts have allowed states to
exercise over tribal affairs, courts have held that Congress has “plena22
ry power” over Indian affairs. Thus, Indian sovereignty “exists only
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defea23
sance.” This principle was originally justified by the theory that the
24
federal government has a guardian-ward relationship with the tribes.
More recently, the Supreme Court has justified it through a broad interpretation of the powers vested by the Constitution’s Indian Com25
merce Clause.
Congress has enacted legislation pursuant to its “plenary power”
on numerous occasions. The Major Crimes Act, enacted in 1885,
granted federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on Indian
26
lands. The Indian Reorganization Act, enacted in 1934, was designed to stop allotment of Indian lands and promote tribal self27
government. In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act,
which applied various constitutional limitations to tribal govern28
ments. These laws have generally had the effect of either enabling
federal authority over tribal affairs or expanding individual rights
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27
28

See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1946) (holding that New York
had the power to punish offenses by non-Indians against non-Indians for disturbing the
peace and order).
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458–59 (1995).
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 354 (2001).
See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 112 (2005) (explaining that
state law plays a small role within a tribe’s territorial boundaries).
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises a duty of protection,
and with it the power.”)
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs . . . .”).
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006).
Id. §§ 1301–1303.
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against the power of tribal governments. Perhaps the most expansive
and important exercise of Congress’s plenary power came in 1953
with the passage of PL-280.
B. Federal and State Authority over Indian Affairs After the Passage of PL280
Enacted pursuant to its “plenary power,” PL-280 granted a great
deal of authority over tribal affairs to the states. This authority in29
cluded jurisdiction over “offenses committed by or against Indians”
in Indian country and “civil causes of action between Indians or to
30
which Indians are parties” occurring in Indian country. Thus, criminal law enforcement, which had been primarily enforced by federal
and tribal authorities, and civil adjudicative jurisdiction, which had
been primarily administered by tribal authorities alone, came under
the concurrent jurisdiction of both tribal and state authorities. PL280 did require states to provide full faith and credit to tribal court
31
judgments. While it was not the first authorization of state power
32
over tribal affairs, PL-280 was the broadest and most far-reaching.
PL-280 was passed for a number of purposes. It was primarily part
of an effort to terminate Indian tribes and assimilate Indian popula33
tions into state political systems. It also served President Eisenhower’s goal of cutting the budget by replacing the Bureau of Indian Af34
fairs (“BIA”) budget with state resources. Finally, it was seen as an
effort to curb perceived “lawlessness” on tribal lands by allowing a
35
state police presence.
The grant of jurisdiction specifically applied to six states: Alaska,
36
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Other
states were given the option of adopting such jurisdiction if they

29
30
31
32

33
34
35
36

18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 1162(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century?
Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 697–700 (2006) (noting that prior to PL-280,
Congress had placed some reservations in the Midwest and in New York under state jurisdiction, but that with the passage of PL-280 “Congress for the first time injected state
criminal jurisdiction into Indian country on a large scale”). While the focus of this Article is on PL-280, the critiques of PL-280 may be applicable to any federal statute authorizing state jurisdiction over Indian affairs.
Id. at 701–02 (noting that transferring reservation populations from federal to state jurisdiction would foster the cultural and political integration of Native people as individuals).
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
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wished.37 Tribes, on the other hand, were not given the option to
38
consent, but rather, were compelled to accept state jurisdiction.
When signing PL-280, President Eisenhower expressed “grave
39
doubts” over the lack of a consent provision. Although the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act added a provision requiring tribal consent before state jurisdiction could be granted, it was not applied retroactive40
Not surprisingly, no tribe has ever consented to state
ly.
41
jurisdiction.
C. Legal Challenges to PL-280
Predictably, several major legal challenges have been brought
against PL-280. In Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Nation, the Supreme Court upheld PL-280 against an equal pro42
tection challenge. In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court held that PL280 did not subordinate tribes “to the full panoply of civil regulatory
43
The
powers, including taxation, of state and local governments.”
Supreme Court, however, has never addressed whether Congress had
the constitutional authority to enact PL-280. Only a handful of lower
courts have ever even addressed this aspect of the constitutionality of
44
PL-280, and none of them offers a particularly satisfactory analysis.
In Anderson v. Britton, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed an
45
early challenge to PL-280. A tribal member convicted in an Oregon
37

38
39

40
41
42

43
44

45

Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 701 n.24 (noting that currently four additional
states—Florida, Idaho, Montana, and Washington—exercise some degree of jurisdiction
under PL-280).
Id. at 703 (“One of the striking features of Public Law 280, however, is the fact that affected tribes did not consent to its adoption and implementation.”).
Id.; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (1997). Goldberg-Ambrose also presents
some arguments similar to those contained in this Article, primarily that the lack of a
consent provision is questionable in “a nation that grounds political legitimacy on ‘consent of the governed,’” and the fact that treaties did not contemplate state jurisdiction
and, indeed, often could be understood to specifically exclude it. Id. at 1407.
Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 703–04.
Id. at 704.
439 U.S. 463 (1979). In this case, the Court upheld a Washington statute taking jurisdiction pursuant to PL-280, despite its discriminatory effect because “‘the unique legal status
of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutional offensive.”
Id. at 500–01 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976).
See Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d. 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1961); Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians’ Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Anderson v. Britton, 318 P.2d 291 (Or. 1957); State v. Fanning, 759 P.2d 937 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1988).
Britton, 318 P.2d at 291.
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state court of a murder committed on the Klamath Indian Reservation filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that Oregon did not have
46
jurisdiction over his crime. The court began its analysis from the
47
presumption that Congress has “plenary power over Indian affairs.”
It reasoned that states naturally possess police power over Indians
and Indian country, but this authority had been preempted by feder48
al law. Therefore, when Congress decided to “withdraw” from that
field, the state naturally assumed that power, and there was no ques49
tion of Congress’s authority to delegate. Finally, the court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that the tribe had only agreed, via treaty, to
50
submit to the laws of the United States, not to the laws of Oregon.
Thus, “[t]he treaty was not the source of federal power, but it was
51
merely a means by which dormant, federal power was exercised.”
On habeas review, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis, explaining that Congress’s power over Indian
affairs was “not so inherently or exclusively federal as to apply beyond
the extent to which the federal government has preempted the
52
field.”
Other courts examining the constitutionality of PL-280 have come
to similar conclusions. In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians’ Tribal
Council v. City of Palm Springs, the tribal council sued the city for a declaratory judgment that the city’s zoning laws were not applicable to
53
tribal lands. The federal district court rejected the tribe’s argument
that PL-280 was an unconstitutional delegation of authority and noted that although Congressional power over Indians is “plenary” and
54
“absolute,” it is not exclusive. The court held that Congress was not
only able to take jurisdiction under the power to regulate commerce
55
with Indian tribes, but was also able to relinquish such power. PL-

46
47
48

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 293.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 300. The court reasoned that power over on-reservation activity is not inherently
“federal” because (1) non-Indians on reservation are still subject to state laws and (2) Indians off reservation are subject to state laws. Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d, 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1961).
347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53 (noting that Congress has preempted the field of regulation of Indian land until
the day when “the Indian has developed culturally to a point where he can deal with and
manage his own affairs”).
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280, consequently, was “a withdrawal by Congress from its preemp56
tion in this field.”
In Robinson v. Wolff, another federal district court upheld the con57
stitutionality of PL-280 in a habeas corpus proceeding. The court
reasoned that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress only to
regulate commerce and that a statute prohibiting murder “could
58
hardly be placed in the category of regulating commerce.” Nonetheless, it held that such power was not “within the exclusive purview
of the government of the United States” and that it was an acceptable
59
exercise of state police power. The court exercised great deference
to Congress, holding that “the degree to which Congress should exercise its power over Indian affairs is a question, I think, for Congress
60
and not for this court.” The court also rejected the argument that
tribes contemplated being subject only to the jurisdiction of federal
61
courts and not the jurisdiction of state courts.
Perhaps the most thoughtful discussion of the constitutionality of
62
PL-280 came from the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Fanning.
An Idaho court convicted a member of the Coeur d’Alene tribe of
63
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. She
challenged her conviction in part on the ground that there was no
constitutional provision supporting the exercise of power under PL64
280. The court observed that “[o]n first blush, Fanning’s argument
has merit,” based on the lack of an enumerated congressional power
65
over Indian criminal jurisdiction. It then held, however, that, within
the context of established “plenary power” over Indian affairs, no
constitutional provision denied Congress “the power to regulate the
operation of motor vehicles by Indians while in Indian country—or to
66
pass such regulatory power to the states.” It then acknowledged the
theory from Anderson that “states possess inherent jurisdiction which
lies dormant while federal jurisdiction exists but awakens when fed-

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
349 F. Supp. 514 (D. Neb. 1972).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 522–23.
759 P.2d 937 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 940.
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eral jurisdiction is withdrawn.”67 The court expressly declined to “de68
cide whether these theories are legally and historically sound.”
These cases loosely suggest two basic theories to support a broad
Congressional delegation like that contained in PL-280. Under the
first approach, Congress has the authority to “withdraw” from the
regulation of Indian law, allowing inherent state authority to “awak69
en” and fill the void. Under the second approach, like the one applied in Fanning, Congress has the authority to broadly delegate its
power over Indian tribes to the states, even if those states would have
70
lacked the power themselves.
This Article argues that neither of these approaches justifies the
constitutionality of PL-280 because (1) states lack inherent authority
over Indian tribes, and therefore such authority cannot “awaken”
when Congress withdraws; and, (2) the power to manage Indian affairs is an inherently and exclusively federal power, and therefore
Congress cannot delegate it to states. These conclusions first require
an explanation for why certain powers are inherently or exclusively
federal and why the Constitution prohibits the states from exercising
those powers, even when specifically authorized by Congress to do so.
This explanation lies in the principle of constitutional preemption.
II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION
This Part sets out the theoretical basis for constitutional preemption, which will form the basis for the argument that Congress cannot
delegate away the powers it delegated in PL-280. It begins by defining the concept of constitutional preemption. It then argues that
constitutional preemption is inherent in the structure of the Constitution for two reasons. First, the act of constitutional creation is an
act of popular sovereignty, in which the people divide sovereign authority and set out specific limits on the authority of their government agents. Second, by dividing sovereign authority between states
and the federal government and vesting specific powers in the federal
government, the people created limits on authority that cannot be
67
68
69

70

Id. at 940 n.3.
Id.
This theory holds that “states possess inherent jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country,
and that this authority lies dormant while federal jurisdiction exists but awakens when
federal jurisdiction is withdrawn.” FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
6.09[1], at 538 (2005).
Id. § 6.04[3][a], at 544 (“Courts typically characterize an exercise of federal power authorizing state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country as a delegation of Congress’s
otherwise preemptory authority over Indian nations to the states.”)
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breached by acts of “normal politics”—as opposed to genuinely popular (constitution-creating) acts.
A. Defining Constitutional Preemption
Constitutional preemption falls at the intersection of two doctrines of constitutional law. The first is the familiar doctrine of
preemption. As a basic principle, preemption holds that “valid federal law overrides otherwise valid state law in cases of conflict between
71
the two.” The Preemption Doctrine is generally described as arising
72
from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Preemption
73
may occur when Congress explicitly chooses to preempt state law or
where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
74
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
A wide variety of powers are shared between the state and federal
75
governments. What about powers that are not shared? The Supremacy Clause defines both the Constitution and federal statutes as
76
the supreme law of the land. Therefore, the Constitution itself can
preempt state law: a state may be “excluded from a field by express
77
language of the Constitution.” Accepting the uncontroversial principle that Congress cannot remove a constitutional limitation on the
states, it follows that the Constitution might preempt a state law even
if Congress has specifically authorized the states to act. This preemp-

71
72

73

74
75

76
77

Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994).
See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (“As the Supreme Court and
virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that
valid federal statutes trump state law.”). But see Gardbaum, supra note 71, at 768 (“[T]he
most common and consequential error is the belief that Congress’s power of preemption
is closely and essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.”).
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that federal law
preempts state law “whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose”).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
See Nelson, supra note 72, at 225 (“The powers of the federal government and the powers
of the states overlap enormously . . . . As a result, nearly every federal statute addresses an
area in which the states also have authority to legislate (or would have such authority if
not for federal statutes).”). The growth of congressional activity in areas shared concurrently with the states has been a major contributing factor in the development of the
Preemption Doctrine. See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Preemption in the U.S. Federal System, 23
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1, 13 (1993) (examining the role of preemption in the unification of certain federal powers).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION,
REGULATION AND LITIGATION 77 (2006).
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tion can be thought of as “direct constitutional preemption,” but for
78
simplicity, this Article will refer to it as “constitutional preemption.”
The second doctrine that constitutional preemption draws from is
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Commerce Clause not only affirmatively grants power to
Congress but “limits the power of the states to regulate interstate
79
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be
commercial activities.”
“waived” by express congressional action, justified by the idea that
80
Congress can undertake “coordinated action” with the states.
Norman Williams’s conception of the Dormant Commerce Clause
provides a framework for understanding constitutional preemption.
Williams argues against the idea that Congress can “waive” Dormant
Commerce Clause restrictions, reasoning that “Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce is fully effective without adding to it the
81
authority to approve unconstitutional state conduct.” He further rejects two other potential arguments: (1) that the Dormant Commerce Clause can be waived because it is merely a “weak” restraint on
state action, unlike other restraints such as the First Amendment or
the Equal Protection Clause; and, (2) that Congress has broad au82
Wilthority to authorize otherwise unconstitutional state action.
liams concludes that “the Constitution’s commitment to economic
union and democratic accountability precludes Congress from validating state laws that would otherwise violate the Dormant Com83
merce Clause.”
Williams’s idea that the Dormant Commerce Clause cannot be
waived illustrates the basic theory of constitutional preemption. Williams focuses on the Constitution’s “aversion to state economic pro84
tectionism” to argue specifically for the exclusively federal nature of
78

79
80
81
82
83
84

The term “constitutional preemption” is not a term of art in the sense described here and
therefore has not been used in a consistent manner. Some commentators have used it to
describe “areas of federal preemption, created by force of the Constitution, in which the
federal courts formulate rules of decision without guidance from statutory or constitutional standards.” Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967). To distinguish it from basic preemption under the Supremacy Clause, some have termed the type of constitutional preemption described in this Article as “direct constitutional preemption.” O’REILLY, supra note
77.
Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53
UCLA L. REV. 153, 160 (2005).
See id. at 193 (explaining Dormant Commerce Clause waiver).
Id. at 202.
See id. at 203 (noting Williams’s rejection of two widely held beliefs concerning our government’s constitutional structure).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 198.

1336

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

the Commerce Clause. This Article argues more broadly that any
power that is “absolutely and totally repugnant to the existence of
85
similar power in the States” or requires national “harmony and uni86
formity” is constitutionally preempted and therefore cannot be exercised by the states, even when expressly authorized by Congress.
B. Constitutional Creation and Popular Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the idea that there can be “but one final, indivisible,
and incontestable supreme authority in every state to which all other
87
authorities must be ultimately subordinate.” Constitutional preemption is dependent on the sovereignty of the people. Popular sovereignty can be thought of as passive, in which the people authorize a
legislature to exercise sovereignty in their place, or active, in which
the people themselves directly govern. U.S. history encompasses
both of these aspects of sovereignty: passive sovereignty during times
of normal politics and, active sovereignty during times of constitutional creation.
1. “Passive” and “Active” Sovereignty
The modern idea that the people are the source of sovereignty is
often traced back to pre-liberal theorists such as Jean Bodin and
88
Thomas Hobbes. But, the idea is perhaps most closely associated
with John Locke, who posited a social contract in which participants
protect their rights to life, liberty, and property by giving up their
right to punish violators of the law of nature and agreeing to be sub89
ject to the will of the majority. Under Locke’s social contract, sovereignty is “passive” in the sense that although people must continuously consent to government, they need not continuously partake in the
90
act of self-government. The legislature dictates the will of the major85
86
87
88

89

90

Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851).
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 345 (1969).
The conception of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism described in this Part is
heavily built upon that set out by Keith Whittington. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 110–23 (1999) (arguing that, in order to further and more accurately and
properly understand popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, we should renew our
commitment to originalism).
See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 6, 13, at 5, 8 (J.W.
Gough ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1948) (1690) (explicating the notion of a social contract
and how government works to “restrain the partiality and violence of men”).
See Joshua Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty, 16
POL. THEORY 99, 103–04 (1988) (discussing how Locke, like Hobbes, “described a social
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ity and makes decisions about the fundamental law, bound by the law
91
of nature. Locke laid the groundwork for the idea of parliamentary
92
sovereignty that is associated with William Blackstone. Blackstone
envisioned a supreme legislature that is unbound by any external
93
form of fundamental law. This vision lacked the American idea of
an “unconstitutional” law because the Constitution was defined by the
94
acts and practices of Parliament.
Blackstone’s “passive” sovereignty can be contrasted with more
“active” models of sovereignty. These models draw a distinction between the people and the legislature. Locke himself argued that the
people retained the right to disestablish the government if it was violating the law of nature and no longer serving the purposes for which
95
it was instituted. Other theorists, such as Rousseau, argued that sovereignty rested only in the people and was inalienable and indivisi96
ble. Rousseau argued that this sovereignty manifested itself as a
“general” will, expressed by a majority vote of an assembled people
engaged in public deliberation for the common good without regard
97
for private interest. The idea of legislative supremacy contrasts with
Rousseau’s vision of popular sovereignty: the role of the government
was not to create fundamental law, but only to implement and execute fundamental law made by the people. Hence, Rousseau’s famous claim that the English people are “free only during the election
of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved,
98
it is nothing.”

91
92

93

94

95
96

97
98

contract by which the people agreed to authorize the government to act in their names
rather than to exercise direct power themselves”).
See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 135, at 68 (explaining that the law of nature and selfpreservation “stands as an eternal rule to all men and legislators”).
Locke is the “modern” source in the sense that Blackstone “built his concept of parliamentary sovereignty on very old models,” particularly on that of Thomas Aquinas.
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
144 (1995).
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156 (arguing that Parliament “hath sovereign and uncontrolable [sic] authority . . . concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal”).
See WOOD, supra note 87, at 261 (describing the British system as one in which “there
could be no distinction between the ‘constitution or frame of government’ and the ‘system of laws.’ All were one: every act of Parliament was in a sense a part of the constitution, and all law, customary and statutory, was thus constitutional.”).
See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 222, at 107–08 (explaining the justification for governmental
disestablishment).
See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 57 (Victor Gourevitch ed., trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1762) (explaining a theory of sovereignty under which
sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, and rests exclusively in the people).
See id. at 60.
Id. at 114.
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2. Dualism and the Federalist Conception of Sovereignty
The American vision of sovereignty during revolutionary times re99
jected “passive” sovereignty. The American Revolution was explicitly
based on Locke’s idea that the people retained the right to throw off
100
the chains of a tyrannical government. The Constitution, however,
forged a third route between “passive” sovereignty and Rousseau’s
radical “active” sovereignty. Like Rousseau, the Federalists insisted
101
that only the people could be sovereign; they departed from Rous102
seau by displacing “the people” from active self-government. They
understood that it was not possible for the people to be constantly
engaged in the kind of civic deliberation necessary for the people to
103
act as sovereigns and further recognized that self-interest and inattentiveness to public matters would generally reign over active delib104
eration and public-spiritedness.
99

100

101

102

103

104

See WOOD, supra note 87, at 261 (“It was precisely on this point [of the relationship of the
legislature to the fundamental law] that the Americans came to differ with the English.”).
See also HOLMES, supra note 92, at 144 (observing that the anti-constitutionalist approaches of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson were consistent with the British view, except
that “[t]hey located sovereignty in the people . . . and not in the government”).
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
to abolish it. . . .”).
The Framers continually referred to the people as the source of sovereignty and emphasized that the political order derived from the people. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49
(James Madison) (“[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power . . . .”). Thus,
the Constitution was not a grant of sovereignty, but an authorization by the people to
government officials to act on their behalf. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the agency relationship between the government and its citizens).
Joshua Miller describes this relationship as one in which the Federalists merely employed
the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, but did not intend for the people to wield power.
MILLER, supra note 90, at 106–07. Instead, the Federalists described a relationship in
which “the people authorized the government to act in their name.” Id. at 107.
A second point is whether it is even desirable for the populace to engage in full-time,
Rousseauan-style pursuit of the general will. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 230–31 (1991) (contending that the modern private citizen finds great satisfaction not from an extremely active political life, as the revolutionaries imagined, but
from engaging in diverse pursuits like sports, business, and family life); RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 173 (2003) (“[E]ither democracy cannot entail massive citizen participation or it is irrelevant to actual practice in modern politics.’”
(citation omitted)).
Madison presupposed that factions would be “united and actuated . . . [and] adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). This, of course, paralleled Rousseau’s fear
of factions and his argument:
[W]hen one of these associations is so large that it prevails over all the rest, the result you have is no longer a sum of small differences, but one single difference;
then there is no longer a general will, and the opinion that prevails is nothing but
a private opinion.
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Because the act of constitutional creation is itself a manifestation
of popular sovereignty that does not occur in the course of ordinary
politics, the American system of sovereignty can be understood as
105
“dualistic democracy.” Under dualistic democracy, self-government
vacillates between moments of “active” sovereignty and moments of
“passive” sovereignty when the people are not present in the act of
self-government. During those times when the people engage in deliberative popular sovereignty—what Bruce Ackerman calls “higher
106
lawmaking” —they enshrine their decisions as a restraint on future
political activity. The role of a court engaging in constitutional interpretation, according to Ackerman, is to preserve the decisions
made by the people during the “constitutional moments” when they
107
engage in an act of true popular sovereignty.
The people, of course, can produce only approximations of true
108
Nonetheless, dualism offers a helpful guide
popular sovereignty.
pointing us toward the idea of constitutional preemption by prevent109
ing us from improperly conflating the government and the people.
By doing so, it focuses upon the importance of constitutional constraints to preserve the decisions made by the people in moments of

105

106
107

108

109

ROUSSEAU, supra note 96, at 60.
Dualism contrasts the normal operation of government with sporadic acts of true, Roussean-style popular sovereignty. In Bruce Ackerman’s terms, “[d]ecisions by the People
occur rarely, and under special constitutional conditions.” ACKERMAN, supra note 103, at
6. They occur through a process of broad support of the people, proposals for constitutional reform, and “mobilized popular deliberation.” Id. at 266. Sheldon Wolin has described democracy in terms of “the political,” which expresses “moments of commonality
when, through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the
wellbeing of the collectivity.” Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 11,
11 (1994). During times of “politics,” democracy does not exist at all. Democracy, instead, is “a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when the political is remembered.” Id. at 23. And while it is “periodically lost” and “doomed to succeed only temporarily,” it is “a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political survives.” Id.
ACKERMAN, supra note 103, at 6.
See id. at 9–10 (explaining that courts serve democracy by protecting the hard-won principles of a mobilized citizenry against erosion). See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 88, at 52
(arguing that fidelity to constitutional text is crucial because it represents our capacity to
govern ourselves and make binding decisions about our future).
Thus, “[a] collectivity cannot formulate coherent purposes apart from all decisionmaking procedures. ‘The people’ cannot act as an amorphous blob.” HOLMES, supra
note 92, at 167. The same is true of the creation of the Constitution: “[L]ike all other
political institutions, constitution-making bodies are merely imperfect procedural representations of the people.”
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 33 n.54 (2001).
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 88, at 138 (noting that, because the popular sovereign is not
active, “a government that claims the full authority of the people is claiming more authority than it rightfully possesses.”).
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sovereignty.110 As this Article will later explain, this understanding is
crucial to the context of PL-280 because federalism is a particularly
important, popular constitutional constraint on both states and the
federal government.
The very act of popular constitutional creation provides the
strongest basis for an idea of constitutional preemption. The people
always retain their sovereignty and authorize the government to act
111
subject to certain limitations. Federalism is a defining constitutional restraint in the American system. Traditionally, states are thought
of as “residual” sovereigns that receive all the powers not delegated to
the federal government. Accepting the federalist conception of popular sovereignty, this is only partly true: states are not restrained un112
der the Constitution to enumerated powers, but they are still only
agents of the people. While states possess unenumerated powers, the
Constitution can still act as a popular restraint on state action.
The relationship between popular sovereignty and federalism is
central to the doctrine of constitutional preemption. This point is
again best illustrated by Norman Williams’s argument that the Congress cannot authorize state action that is otherwise precluded by the
113
Particularly relevant is Williams’s reDormant Commerce Clause.
sponse to William Cohen’s broad argument that “Congress can consent to state laws where constitutional restrictions bind the states but
114
not Congress.” Cohen argues that constitutional restraints that apply only to the states, as opposed to restraints that apply only to the
federal government, “do not reduce the residuum of sovereignty possessed by the United States but merely allocate it among the federal
115
government and the states.” Williams responds first that Supreme
Court case law is inconsistent with the idea that Congress can waive
110
111

112
113
114
115

See id. at 137–38 (discussing the virtues of dualism).
Alexander Hamilton described the relationship of the people to the legislature as one of
a principal to its agent. The Constitution bound the legislature because the legislature
was constrained by the terms the people placed on it when they authorized it to act.
To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that
the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only
what their powers do not authorise, [sic] but what they forbid.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). According to Hamilton, the Constitution
was thus the “fundamental law” derived directly from the people, and the role of the
Court was to ascertain and apply that law. Id.
Madison’s argument contained the caveat that states retain residual power over “all other
objects” not enumerated in the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
See Williams, supra note 79, at 159.
Id. at 203 (quoting William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 406 (1983)).
Williams, supra note 79, at 204.
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such federalism-based constitutional restraints.116 Second, he argues
that Cohen’s theory “invites the same centrifugal forces that the Constitution’s allocation of powers was meant to forestall and undermines the principles of accountability underlying our political sys117
Third, he claims that the constitutional allocation of power
tem.”
between states and the federal government could not possibly permit
118
Thus Cohen’s theory,
Congress to change that allocation at will.
taken to its logical conclusion, would permit Congress to essentially
“vote itself out of existence” or allow Congress to suspend the Consti119
tution altogether.
C. Why the Federalist Conception of Popular Sovereignty Supports
Constitutional Preemption
The two models of sovereignty I have described—parliamentary
sovereignty and popular sovereignty—are analogous to two contrasting visions of federalism: the idea of federalism as a compact
among sovereign states and the idea of federalism as a compact
among sovereign people. If the Constitution is a compact among the
people, then a doctrine of constitutional preemption is necessary to
preserve the division of power between the states and the federal
government set out by the people.
The state-sovereignty model is, in a sense, the analog to the idea
of parliamentary supremacy. Under this model, the federal government is merely the product of independent sovereigns joining together and ceding away measures of authority to a central government.
These independent sovereigns, then, are free of any
constitutional constraints save those in their state constitutions or
those to which they agreed in the Federal Constitution. The popular
sovereignty approach, on the other hand, is analogous to a more active model of sovereignty. Under this model, neither the states nor
the federal government are sovereigns. They are agents of the people who receive their authority to act independently from a popular

116

117
118
119

See id. at 204–05 (explaining the Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence on the waiver of federalism-based constitutional restraints). Williams points out that the Supreme Court has
prohibited Congress from authorizing states to violate both the Contract Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. He cites, for example, the Court’s holding that
“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 208
(quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999)).
Williams, supra note 79, at 209.
See id. at 210 (explaining why the Constitution forbids Congress to freely alter this allocation).
See id. at 209–10 (discussing the dangers of accepting Cohen’s theory).
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sovereign that reserves its right to modify or alter the terms of their
authority at its will. Thus, constraints on state power in the Federal
Constitution are not constraints agreed to by the states as sovereigns,
but constraints placed upon them by the sovereign people.
On the surface, the state-sovereignty model is compelling. Much
of the Constitution suggests state sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment reserves rights not granted to the federal government to the
120
states and the people. The president is not elected by the people,
121
but by electors from the states. Finally, the Senate serves to repre122
sent the states, not the people as a whole. Madison, arguing for the
structure of the Senate in The Federalist No. 62, explicitly appealed to
the idea of the Senate as “giving to the state governments such an
agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure
123
the authority of the former.” Similarly, according to Madison, the
very nature of an enumerated federal government “leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other ob124
jects.”
The state-sovereignty model supports what might be thought of as
a “thin” doctrine of constitutional preemption. At its most basic level, federalism derives from the idea of a compact among sovereigns
for mutual protection. Locke, for example, separated powers into
the legislative, executive, and “federative.” The federative power
managed the relationship between those governed by the compact
125
with external forces that were not. Even Montesquieu, an advocate
of small republics, acknowledged the utility in a confederation for the

120

121
122

123
124
125

See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (explaining that democratically elected senators and representatives elect the President).
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, while shifting the election of senators from
state legislatures to state voters, does not diminish the fact that the Senate still represents
individual states, given the fact that states are still apportioned two seats regardless of
population. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (describing how the senators were chosen by the
legislature); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the People thereof for six years; and
each Senator shall have one Vote.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
Locke draws the distinction between “the execution of the municipal laws of the society
within itself” and “the management of the security and interest of the public without.”
LOCKE, supra note 89, § 147. Under this distinction, the executive power is bound by positive legislation, while the federative power is bound only by the prudence of those who
exercise it. Id.
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common defense.126 Madison argued that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other na127
tions.”
Thus, the state-sovereignty model suggests at least a degree of
constitutional preemption to which the states are, by the nature of
their agreement, precluded from engaging in foreign affairs that implicate the whole. This “thin” notion of constitutional preemption is
suggested by the constitutional prohibition on states entering into
treaties, alliances, or confederations or making compacts with one
128
another without the consent of Congress.
Despite its appeal, the state-sovereignty model is not a compelling
description of the republic. First, such a model is incompatible with
the central legal and political arguments the Federalists posed to
support ratification. The central theoretical obstacle to the Constitution was the anti-federalist claim that only one sovereign could rule
and that the state governments were the only sovereigns in their terri129
tory. Logically, “two sovereignties can not co-exist within the same
limits” and placing them together would ultimately lead to “the even130
The Federalists retual annihilation of the state sovereignties.”
solved this problem by taking the position that sovereignty could only
131
They argued that both state and
rest in the hands of the people.
federal governments could exist in the same territory because neither
was sovereign; they both were merely agents authorized to act by the
132
sovereign people. And, because the sovereign people could authorize each government to act within its respective sphere, “[t]hey can
133
no more clash than two parallel lines can meet.” Thus, the gist of
the federalist argument was that “[t]he state legislatures could there-

126

127
128
129
130
131
132

133

Montesquieu argued:
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it
is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within reach of
every citizen; abuses have less extent, and of course, are less protected.
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120, at § 16 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1748).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Wood, supra note 87, at 527–29.
Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
See supra note 101.
See Wood, supra note 87, at 530–31 (describing how neither the state nor federal government could be sovereign because the people can distribute one portion to the state government and one portion to the federal government); Miller, supra note 90, at 106 (“The
Federalists would have denied that they advocated any sovereignty in the United States
except that of the people.”).
Wood, supra note 87, at 529.
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fore never lose their sovereignty under the new Constitution, as the
134
Antifederalists claimed, because they never possessed it.”
Most powerfully, the very illegality of the act of constitutional creation emphasized that it was a popular act, not a state act. Madison
defended the decision not to follow the unanimous consent provision
in the Articles of Confederation. He cited the Declaration of Independence for the proposition that the people have a right to “abolish
or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect
135
The Convention, for Madison, was a
their safety and happiness.”
group of “patriotic and respectable citizen[s]” taking action on behalf
of a people who could not “spontaneously and universally . . . move in
136
If the Convention’s proposal were
concert towards their object.”
“submitted to the people themselves,” its “supreme authority” would
137
By conceding
“blot out all antecedent errors and irregularities.”
the illegality of the Convention, Madison enhanced the authority of
the convention by “linking it to the institutional form that Publius’s
138
contemporaries associated most intimately with We the People.” In
other words, the very reason the Constitution was legitimate was that
it did not follow the requirements of the Articles of Confederation,
but rather was created by the people themselves.
Because constitutional creation is an act of popular sovereignty,
the people, through the act of constitutional creation, placed certain
powers in the hands of the federal government and reserved others
for state governments. Therefore, just as the federal government may
not reach beyond its enumerated powers into inherently state powers,
states cannot infringe on the realm of inherently federal powers. The
“lines” of federalism were drawn by the people themselves, and because neither the states nor the federal government are sovereigns
capable of exchanging their powers. Therefore, this limitation applies
to delegations of power just as much as it applies to usurpations of
power.

134

135
136
137
138

Id. at 531. See also id. at 530 (“More boldly and more fully than anyone else, [James] Wilson developed the argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist
thinking.”). Wilson countered the anti-federalist appeal to state sovereignty with the argument that “sovereignty always stayed with the people-at-large,” who could only delegate
it on limited terms to the government. Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Ackerman, supra note 103, at 175. See also Whittington, supra note 88, at 125 (arguing
that the device of a popular convention made “a sharp distinction between government
and society and emphasized that ultimate political authority resided in the latter”).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
This Part argues that PL-280 is an unconstitutional delegation of
inherently and exclusive federal powers to the states. First, this Part
sets out a framework for determining whether a federal power is constitutionally preempted. Second, it looks at the source of federal
powers over Indian affairs to conclude that this power is constitutionally preempted. Third, it describes how the doctrine of constitutional
preemption should apply to PL-280 in particular.
A. The Framework for Constitutional Preemption
The first step in determining whether a state’s exercise of a particular federal power is constitutionally preempted is to set out a
standard for determining which powers are constitutionally preempted. Although this issue has arisen infrequently, the basic framework
for constitutional preemption was set out by Alexander Hamilton in
The Federalist No. 32 and elaborated by the Supreme Court in several
cases.
1. The Federalist No. 32
In The Federalist No. 32, Alexander Hamilton sought to reassure
the states that the federal power to tax would not deprive states of
139
their concurrent power to do so. He argued that if the union were
a complete consolidation, the states would retain only those powers
140
provided by the “general will.” Because the union amounted to only a partial consolidation, states would retain all rights of sovereignty
141
except those “exclusively delegated to the United States.” Three categories of powers would be within the exclusive province of the federal government:
[1] where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; [2] where it granted in one instance an authority to the
Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and [3] where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a
similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradic142
tory and repugnant.

139

140
141
142

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]ndividual States should possess an
independent and uncontrolable [sic] authority to raise their own revenues for the supply
of their own wants.”).
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).

1346

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

By Hamilton’s own terms, the “totally contradictory and repugnant”
category was intentionally narrow, and it was necessary to distinguish
it from those circumstances in which there were conflicts of policy
but no “direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional
143
authority.”
Hamilton offered examples of exclusively federal powers. Legislation over the district to be the seat of government was, by express
144
The clause providing the
constitutional language, “exclusive.”
power to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports explicitly prohibited states from exercising that power, subject to the caveat that
145
Finally, the clause
states could do so with congressional consent.
providing Congress the power “to establish an [sic] uniform rule of
naturalization” was necessarily exclusively federal; otherwise, the rule
146
would not be uniform.
The Federalist No. 32 offers a clear and simple framework for understanding the idea of constitutional preemption. It does not, however, resolve the question of whether Congress can constitutionally
delegate its authority over an exclusively federal power to the states.
Several Supreme Court decisions shed further light on this question.
2. Judicial Approaches to Constitutional Preemption
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Supreme Court applied Hamil147
Cooley reviewed a
ton’s constitutional-preemption framework.
Pennsylvania law regulating the piloting of ships into the Port of
148
Philadelphia. The Court, accepting that the regulation was within
the scope of the Commerce Clause, pointed to a congressional act of
1789 stating that piloting “shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States” until further congressional ac149
tion. The Court held:
If the States were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the
grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not
confer upon them power thus to legislate. If the Constitution excluded
the States from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress
150
cannot regrant, or in any manner reconvey to the States that power.

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218 (emphasis omitted).
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.

May 2013]

PREEMPTION, PUBLIC LAW 280, AND FEDERALISM

1347

The Court then considered “whether the grant of the commercial
power to Congress did per se deprive the States of all power to regu151
late pilots.” It suggested two ways that this could occur: (1) if state
power was expressly excluded by the text of the Constitution; or, (2)
if the nature of the power was “absolutely and totally repugnant to
152
the existence of similar power in the States.”
Ultimately, the Court held that the power to regulate pilots did
not “admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation” and
153
This contherefore was not exclusively in the hands of Congress.
clusion was supported by a tradition of state regulation in the area
and the necessity of conforming policy to local needs based upon lo154
cal knowledge. As a parting comment, the Court suggested a strong
form of Constitutional preemption: if the Commerce Clause did deprive states of their power to regulate pilots, “it may be doubted
whether Congress could, with propriety, recognize them as laws and
155
adopt them as its own acts.”
The power most clearly “repugnant to the existence of similar
156
power in the States” is the power over foreign affairs. The idea that
foreign affairs are constitutionally preempted is essential to even the
thinnest conception of federalism. In fact, the Supreme Court has
used the language of constitutional preemption in cases involving
foreign policy and international affairs. The Court has held: “The
Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests
of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility
157
for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.” This principle
draws directly from the principles of federalism embodied in Locke’s
federative power, Montesquieu’s description of the confederate republic, and Madison’s argument that, if federalism means anything, it
means the central government possesses sole authority to speak for
158
the units on matters of foreign policy. It is also consistent with the
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

158

Id.
Id. Following the framework set out in The Federalist No. 32, the Court cited the power to
legislate for the District of Columbia as an example of one such power. Id.
Id. at 319.
See id. (“[L]egislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable to the local
peculiarities of the ports within their limits.”)
Id. at 321.
Id. at 318.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (emphasis added). The Court further explained: “Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and
states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be entirely free from local interference.” Id.
See supra notes 125–27.
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Framers’ view that the primary end of the federal government was
159
collective safety and security.
Zschernig v. Miller demonstrates the broad scope of the Court’s ap160
proach to the constitutional preemption of foreign affairs. Zschernig
concerned an Oregon law that placed limitations on the right of non161
resident aliens to inherit property in Oregon. One of these limitations was that the foreign heirs must have the right to receive the
162
proceeds “without confiscation.” Determining whether confiscation
occurred “led into minute inquiries concerning the actual admin163
It would have required Oregon probate
istration of foreign law.”
judges to make determinations regarding whether foreign citizens en164
joyed the same rights as Oregon citizens. According to the Court,
its earlier precedent did not permit “[t]hat kind of state involvement
in foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Con165
The Court
stitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government.”
went on to emphasize the exclusive nature of federal control over
foreign affairs:
The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and
distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way if they impair
the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy. Where those laws
conflict with a treaty, [the states] must bow to the superior federal policy
. . . . Certainly a State could not deny admission to a traveler from East
Germany nor bar its citizens from going there. If there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government. The present
159

160
161
162
163
164
165

The authors of The Federalist believed that “[t]he utility of such a Union, and therefore
the chief ends it will serve, is that it will strengthen the American people against the dangers of ‘foreign war’ and secure them from the dangers of ‘domestic convulsion.’” Martin
Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 52, 62 (1959). These themes are repeated throughout the first set of the Federalist Papers, entitled “The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). John Jay argued that “[a]mong the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of
providing for their safety seems to be first.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay). He went
on to argue that in the case of war, the federal government “most favors the safety of the
people.” Id. Furthermore, Jay argued that, for a number of reasons, one federal government would be better equipped to avoid foreign wars than state governments. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay). The Federalists also frequently cited ancient Greek confederacies as examples of federal systems that ultimately failed due to weakness, disunity,
and decentralization. CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME,
AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 104–10 (1994).
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 440 (holding that the statute “seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own”).
Id. at 436.
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Oregon law . . . has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well
adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those
166
problems.

At least in the area of foreign affairs, the idea of constitutional
preemption has been adopted by the Supreme Court. But, how does
constitutional preemption apply to other powers? More importantly,
how does it apply when Congress actually delegates its own power to
the states?
This precise situation was addressed in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stew167
art. In Knickerbocker, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a
law that applied the workmen’s compensation laws of the states to in168
juries that occurred within maritime and admiralty jurisdiction.
The Court held that the very nature of the Article I grant prevented
Congress from delegating it:
The subject was intrusted [sic] to [Congress] to be dealt with according
to its discretion—not for delegation to others . . . . [S]uch an authorization would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the
Constitution not only contemplated but actually established—it would
169
defeat the very purpose of the grant.

According to the Court, if Congress could allow states to make their
own laws regarding maritime employment, “there [would] at once
arise the confusion and uncertainty which the Framers of the Consti170
tution both foresaw and undertook to prevent.”
Nonetheless, nearly forty years later, the Court took a much more
deferential approach to constitutional preemption. A situation relatively analogous to the situation of PL-280 arose in United States v.
171
Sharpnack. Sharpnack involved the prosecution of a sex crime under
172
The Act applied state criminal
the 1948 Assimilative Crimes Act.
law to crimes committed in federal enclave jurisdiction, even if those
173
laws were passed subsequent to the passage of the Act. The Court
held that this did not constitute a delegation of power to the states,
174
but was simply a matter of Congress adopting state law as its own.

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 440–41 (citations omitted).
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
355 U.S. 286 (1958).
Id. at 286–87.
Id. at 287–88.
Id. at 293–94 (“The basic legislative decision made by Congress is its decision to conform
the laws in the enclaves to the local laws as to all offenses not punishable by any enactment of Congress.”).
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Justice William Douglas dissented, laying out an argument that
175
He argued that, altapplies equally to the delegation in PL-280.
hough Congress can set up a scheme and leave it up to the states to
fill in the details:
[I]t is Congress that must determine the policy, for that is the essence of
lawmaking. Under the scheme now approved a State makes such federal
law, applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that law becomes federal
law, for the violation of which the citizen is sent to prison.
Here it is a sex crime on which Congress has never legislated. Tomorrow it may be . . . a law that could never command a majority in the
Congress or that in no sense reflected its will . . . . [The defendant] is entitled to the considered judgment of Congress whether the law applied to
176
him fits the federal policy. That is what federal lawmaking is.

Justice Douglas argued that while the Act was more convenient for
Congress, “convenience is not material to the constitutional prob177
lem.” The law simply amounted to “a State, not the Congress,” ex178
ercising Article I legislative powers.
The majority in Knickerbocker and Douglas’s dissent in Sharpnack
both framed the issue in terms of nondelegation rather than preemption, but read together with Cooley, they help to refine the framework
set up by Hamilton. Hamilton’s third category of exclusively federal
powers might be separated into (1) powers that most seriously demand the harmony and uniformity of national action, and (2) powers
that deal with matters external to the union or necessary for to the
regulation of its members.
How do we define these two categories of inherently federal powers? Matters of foreign policy would fall in this category, and Knickerbocker suggests that admiralty and maritime laws would as well. Beyond this, precedent offers little insight into which constitutional
powers are so inherently federal as to meet this test. One might imagine other Article I powers falling in this category—naturalization,
the coining of money, the regulation of federal courts—at least inso179
far as these powers do not overlap with state police powers. Another power that more directly relates to the regulation of relations
among states is the congressional power to consent to an interstate
180
compact. There is something uniquely federal about these powers
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 297 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another state . . . .”).
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that Congress could not constitutionally delegate them to the states.
The next Subpart examines the power to manage Indian affairs and
concludes that it is constitutionally preempted under the standards I
have described.
B. The Sources of Federal Power over Indian Affairs
Building on the framework set out in The Federalist No. 32 and further defined in Cooley and Knickerbocker, this Subpart argues that the
power to manage Indian affairs is inherently and exclusively federal.
This determination is based on the two most plausible sources of federal power: “internal” sources, namely the Indian Commerce
181
182
Clause, and “external” sources, namely the Treaty Power and treaties themselves.
1. The Indian Commerce Clause
The Constitution makes only a few references to Indians or Indian
tribes, so caution is necessary when attempting to locate an explicit
constitutional source of federal power over Indian affairs. Of these
explicit references, the most important provision has been the Indian
183
Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
184
with the Indian tribes.” Particularly helpful for our purposes is the
Dormant Commerce Clause, implying “limitations on the exercise of
185
state authority over the same subject.” Although, as discussed earlier, this doctrine is often understood in terms of the Interstate Commerce Clause, Robert Clinton has put forth a powerful argument in
181
182
183

184
185

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
In one sense, the most significant reference to Indians in the Constitution is in the Apportionment Clause. Both as originally written and as amended by the Fourteenth
Amendment, this clause exempts “Indians not taxed” from being counted for the purposes of apportioning congressional seats. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. On the one
hand, the clause can be understood as a restraint on state power, insofar as it provides
“that Indians not taxed by the state are not within the polity of the state, especially not
subject to its jurisdiction.” Monette, supra note 8, at 630 n.83. On the other hand, given
the integration of tribes into the federal system, the clause may “support the contention
that the tribes are now as much within our system as without.” Id. This Article does not
discuss the Apportionment Clause in depth because it is not a source of federal power,
but merely a description of how to apportion taxes and representation.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1060
(1995).
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favor of a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause based on original un186
derstanding and historical practice. Clinton offers a crucial insight
into the principles that take us towards constitutional preemption.
The Indian Commerce Clause originated from the tensions between state and federal power that developed during the confederation period. Early drafts of the Articles of Confederation contained
provisions seeking to nationalize authority over Indian affairs, and an
initial proposal based on these drafts gave the national government
“sole and exclusive” power in “managing all Affairs with the Indi187
ans.” To accommodate states that insisted on managing their own
affairs with the Indians, the ultimate provision contained the proviso
“provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be
188
not infringed or violated.” The negotiation of federal treaties con189
tinued throughout the confederation period, and the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which created a government for western territories, contained broad protections for tribes and greatly centralized
190
power to deal with them in the national government. Nonetheless,
the confederation period was plagued by tensions between the state
and national governments that “had led the young nation to the
191
brink of Indian warfare on several fronts.”
The limited evidence of the Indian Commerce Clause’s passage
suggests that its purpose was to centralize power to deal with tribes in
the hands of the federal government. James Madison proposed an
initial draft of what would become the Indian Commerce Clause
based on his belief that the new constitution must contain a provision

186
187
188
189
190

191

Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1118 (providing background by describing how the confederate government
reached treaty agreements with Indian tribes).
Id. at 1127 (stating that the ordinance contained provisions that “were clearly designed to
prevent intrusions upon unceded land”). The most pertinent provision stated
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just
and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and
for preserving peace and friendship with them.
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). See also Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a
Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 933 (1995) (“[T]he Northwest Ordinance
is a constitutional document because it authoritatively expresses a set of principles that
have guided national political action.”).
COHEN, supra note 69, § 1.02[3], at 24.
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to prevent state encroachments on federal authority.192 The effect of
the Indian Commerce Clause was to remove the caveat in the Articles
of Confederation protecting state authority to manage affairs with
Indians. Paul Prucha has argued that the “lack of prolonged debate
on the question was a sign of agreement within the convention that
Indian affairs should be left in the hands of the federal govern193
ment.” Clinton, similarly, argues that the lack of debate shows that
the convention was “curing rather than creating,” and that their efforts simply served to “ratify this dominant view, an action that re194
quired and consumed little debate.”
The view that the Indian Commerce Clause was designed to centralize power over Indian affairs is further supported by the arguments put forth in The Federalist. John Jay argued that the centralization of Indian affairs would prevent future turbulence of the kind
experienced during the confederation period:
Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the
present Federal Government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of
individual States, who either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabit195
ants.

Similarly, Madison argued that, under the new Constitution, “[t]he
regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of confederation, which
196
First, it was unrender the provision obscure and contradictory.”
clear under the Articles when Indians were “deemed members of a
197
State.” Second, he argued that “how the trade with Indians, though
not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction,
can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on
198
the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.”
Thus, the Articles “inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impos199
sibilities.”

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1152 (claiming that Madison “saw the problem as a matter
of preventing state encroachment on the exercise of this national authority”).
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 68
(1994).
See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1158.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In sum, Madison “sought to eliminate any and all claims to inher200
The incompatibility of overent state power over Indian affairs.”
lapping state and tribal authority demands a uniformity of federal
policy that regulation of interstate commerce does not.
This understanding does not necessarily conflict with the general
Dormant Commerce Clause rule that “Congress may choose to overrule the judicial invalidation of a particular state regulation by statu201
The prevailing arguments regarding the
torily authorizing it.”
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause do not explicitly claim that it
might limit the authority of the federal government to transfer its
202
power to the states, although that certainly may be an implication.
Under a straightforward Dormant Commerce Clause theory, PL-280
would be a perfectly valid congressional authorization of state power.
What moves the Indian Commerce Clause from merely dormant
to constitutionally preempted is that delegating power over Indian
affairs to the states creates a problem of overlapping sovereignty that
does not arise in normal Commerce Clause matters. This point is illustrated by the anti-federalist argument that sovereignty was indivisible and two sovereigns could reign over the same territory simultane203
The Federalists maintained that such a problem would not
ously.
arise under the Constitution because only the people were sover204
eign. The people could delegate authority to separate governments
which would not pit the people against themselves any more than
205
The specific structure of the
“two parallel lines [could] meet.”
Constitution—a supreme government of enumerated powers and
governments possessing residual powers—offered a practical resolu200
201
202

203

204
205

Clinton, supra note 185, at 1245.
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987).
See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1057–58 (rejecting the argument that the Indian Commerce Clause “imposed no judicially enforceable restraints on the exercise of state power
over persons or property in Indian country.”); Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REV. 667, 669
(1986) (proposing a methodology for applying the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause in
the context of state infringements upon tribal sovereignty); Richard D. Agnew, Note, The
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause: Up in Smoke?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 379 (2001) (“A
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause would provide the federal government the ability to
arm itself with a new and more rigorous standard of review to protect the Indians from
state incursions while exercising its fiduciary responsibility with the tribes.”).
See Wood, supra note 87, at 527–28 (describing the anti-federalist argument that “two coordinate sovereignties would be a solecism in politics . . . it would be contrary to the nature of things that both should exist together—one or the other would necessarily triumph in the fullness of dominion”).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 529.
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tion of these views by preventing two popularly-authorized sovereigns
from colliding.
This overlapping sovereignty cannot be reconciled with the struc206
A comparison of the Indian Commerce
ture of the Constitution.
Clause to the Interstate Commerce Clause shows the problem with
this situation. PL-280 is the Indian Commerce Clause analogy to a
law passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause granting a state
the authority to regulate railroad traffic in another state. These issues of sovereignty have perhaps never arisen in a Dormant Commerce Clause setting because it is patently obvious that the structure
of the Constitution does not allow Congress to extend one state’s jurisdiction into another state.
The Indian Commerce Clause presents a strong basis for the argument that power over Indian affairs is constitutionally preempted.
But, it only provides a basis for constitutional preemption if it provides a satisfying basis for federal power in the first place. It is true
that the Supreme Court has held that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to
207
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” But, only a century earlier,
the Court had found it to be a “very strained construction of this
208
clause” to authorize the federal government to enact criminal laws
governing on-reservation activity by tribal members. While the original understanding of the clause suggests a centralization of the authority to manage Indian affairs in the federal government, it also
suggests that federal authority was limited to the authority to engage
in the kinds of bilateral relationships akin to those governed in the
209
More to the point, the idea that the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
clause might give Congress authority to govern Indians directly is in-

206

207
208
209

James Wilson argued that the people “can distribute one portion of power to the more
contracted circle called State governments; they can also furnish another proportion to
the government of the United States.” Id. at 530–31. But, the Federalists claim that
“[t]he two governments act in different manners, and for different purposes” contradicts
the idea that two sovereigns—states and tribes—might exercise the same powers over the
same territories. Id. at 529.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886).
Clinton, supra note 8, at 131 (“Since the Commerce Clause governs commerce with foreign nations, with which the United States maintained diplomatic contact, the covered
commerce, at least in that context, must be the United States’ side of various bilateral exchanges with foreign nations, including not only trade with those nations . . . .”).
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consistent “with the basic Lockean popular delegation notions that
210
animated the drafting of the [Constitution].”
For these reasons, despite the importance of the Indian Commerce Clause, federal power over Indian affairs must be supplemented by another constitutional source. Richard Monette has argued,
“[T]he ‘Indian Commerce Clause’ alone is not a source of Union
power over the tribes. Such Union power requires the Treaty Clause
211
and a treaty upon which to hang an inter-sovereign relationship.”
To fully understand constitutional preemption in terms of the statefederal-tribal relationship, we must turn to the treaty power.
2. The Treaty Power and Treaty Federalism
The Treaty Clause offers a natural solution to the problems that
result from reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of
federal power over Indian tribes. This is not because the Treaty
Clause by itself provides any source of federal authority over Indian
tribes. Instead, it provides a mechanism for treaty federalism, a federal relationship created through treaties made by governments rather than through constitutions made by the people. Through treaty
federalism, an independent sovereign cedes away some measure of its
sovereignty to a central government, via treaty, in exchange for certain rights and responsibilities as a member unit in the federal relationship.
Theories of treaty federalism have sought to justify and define the
scope of federal power over Indian tribes independent of the Constitution. Advocates of treaty federalism argue that Indian tribes have,
through treaties, entered into a federal relationship with the federal
212
Tribes exist on the same “plane” of sovereignty as
government.
states, although they do not play exactly the same role in the federal
213
system as states do. By entering into a federal relationship with the
union, tribes gave up their status as international actors, but retained
210

211
212
213

Id. at 133. Clinton reaches this conclusion based on the straightforward logic that “Indians were not then citizens, not represented in the Constitutional convention, and not
participants in the state ratification debates.” Id.
Monette, supra note 8, at 640.
See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 275 (describing the tribal federalism procedure
requiring the consent of the tribal people and two-thirds of the Senate).
See Monette, supra note 8, at 619 (“[T]he relationship between the states and the tribes
should reflect the relationship between two states as sovereigns within the same system,
on the same plane, whose sovereign spheres do not overlap but influence each other
through the federal political processes.”); see also Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 270
(describing treaties as “political compacts irrevocably annexing tribes into the federal system in a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the states”).
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their residual powers, much like the states retained their residual
214
powers as described in the Tenth Amendment.
Treaty federalism provides not only a powerful descriptive model
for the federal-state-tribal relationship, but also a strong normative
model, for several reasons. First, it resolves the crucial issue of “con215
sent of the governed.” The Constitution does not provide a satisfying expression of consent by Indian tribes because tribes did not participate in the constitutional convention or otherwise have a voice in
216
Although they are an imperthe creation of the federal republic.
fect expression of consent, treaties provide the vital link through
which tribes have consented to the authority of the federal govern217
Thus, treaty federalism reinforces the basic principles of
ment.
popular sovereignty that date back to Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau, and were reinforced by the federalist vision of the Consti218
tution.
Treaty federalism is also a useful normative model because it answers many of the pragmatic concerns that weaken stronger theories
of tribal self-government. It recognizes that tribes have, to some de-

214

215

216

217

218

Monette argues that the Supreme Court’s application of Tenth Amendment principles to
the state-federal relationship is directly analogous to its application of those principles to
the tribal-federal relationship. Monette, supra note 8, at 634–37. Thus, “the source of
sovereignty is the people or their local government unit, whether states or tribe; and the
directional transfer of that sovereign authority is from those local governments or their
people to the Union, not vice-versa.” Id. at 636–37. For Barsh and Henderson, the relevance of the Tenth Amendment is the idea that the people of the states retained their
right to form (or re-form) local political structures, as long as they remain within the
bounds of the Constitution. Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 261–62. By analogy, if a
treaty “did not relinquish the right to self-government by express terms, then the people
of the tribe must retain the right, enjoyed previously, of changing the form of their government.” Id. at 262.
See Monette, supra note 8, at 632 (“[T]he treaty provides perhaps the best answer to one
question which seems to plague scholars of Indian law . . . . Have American Indian people consented to American government? . . . In the treaties, tribes authorized or at least
consented to the federative nature of the Union/tribe relationship.”).
See Clinton, supra note 8, at 133 (noting that the Indians were not citizens at the time of
the Constitutional Convention, were not represented in the Convention, and were not
participants in the state ratification debates); see also Monette, supra note 8, at 632 (arguing that treaty negotiations instead “served for tribes the function that the constitutional
convention served for states”).
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 276 (describing how some tribes required a tribal
consensus to enter into a treaty with the U.S. and how federal authority arose out of this
consensus).
See id. at 278–79 (explaining how the will of tribe was essential for treaty federalism).
Barsh and Henderson explicitly reject the idea that federal power over Indian tribes arose
out of “conquest,” arguing that, treaty federalism “rests on principles more consonant
with American government.” Id. at 279.

1358

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

gree, entered into the fold of the federal system.219 Russell Lawrence
Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, for example, advocate treaty federalism as an alternative “for the creative establishment of governments in circumstances where conventional statehood would be
economically, socially or politically inappropriate, but where both
220
sovereignties recognize the expedience of permanent union.” Although theoretically, treaty federalism is directly dependent on the
terms of the treaties, a balancing of pragmatic concerns might suggest a uniform theory of treaty federalism that defines the rights and
221
responsibilities of all tribes in relation to the federal government.
The treaty relationship, as a whole, forms a set of constitutional
norms defining the union-tribe relationship on a similar basis to the
union-state relationship. In doing so, the treaty clause preserves the
constitutional structure of a government supreme over certain enumerated powers operating on mutual terms with a government that
exercises residual powers: the theoretical structure used to resolve
the anti-federalist concern about the unitary nature of sovereignty.
The federal-tribal relationship created by treaty federalism supports the doctrine of constitutional preemption and precludes states
from exercising political power over Indian affairs for two reasons.
First, it supports the proposition that federal power over Indian af222
fairs is “absolutely and totally repugnant” to a similar power in the
states. It does so by emphasizing that federal power over Indian affairs arises from a structure external to the constitution itself. Treaties are delegations of power—with reciprocal duties of good faith—
from tribal governments to the sovereign federal government, not
223
Tribes vested
from tribal members to the federal government.
power in the federal government via their authority to make treaties
as independent governments, not merely as part of “the people . . . composing the distinct and independent States” that formed

219

220
221

222
223

Id. at 274 (“Regardless of their original intent, [treaties] have resulted in a complete political and economic integration of tribes into the federal system. Separation is practically
impossible.”).
Id. at 275.
Barsh and Henderson advocate a constitutional amendment affirming treaty federalism,
suggesting “a standardization of tribal powers on the state model to avoid the prospect of
endless judicial interpretations and tribe-by-tribe distinctions.” Id. at 280. They also argue that, because of the complete integration of tribes into the federal system, “it is all
the more essential that their political rights be secured on a fixed and certain basis.” Id.
at 275.
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851).
Monette, supra note 8, at 631–32.
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the Constitution.224 The powers arising from treaty federalism do not
flow from the popular sovereign that created the Constitution, but
instead flow directly through the Treaty Clause, a uniquely federal
225
As the Supreme Court has
mechanism for political agreement.
emphasized, the power to engage in foreign relations is exclusively
226
federal. While tribes may no longer be “foreign” or “international”
227
actors in the truest sense, the fact that the federal-tribal relationship
came into being through treaties emphasizes the inherently federal
nature of the power to manage Indian affairs.
Second, treaty federalism supports the constitutional preemption
of Indian affairs by placing the focus of federal power on the treaty
relationship itself. Treaties themselves sometimes contained terms
228
explicitly precluding state inference with tribal affairs. But, explicit
terms are even less important than the principles that drive the treaty
process. A central principle is that treaties are “not a grant of rights
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of
229
Just as the nature of the Constitution would
those not granted.”
logically prohibit the federal government from giving one state political power over another state, the nature of treaty federalism logically
prohibits the federal government from delegating away the power
that treaties vested solely in it. This principle is consistent with the
Lockean idea that consent-based government authority must remain
224

225

226

227
228

229

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); see also Prucha, supra note 193, at 65 (“Consideration of the Indians as ‘nations’ not as members of the states seemed essential if congressional authority was to prevail over that of states . . . . ”).
Along with the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has pointed to the treaty
clause as a mechanism through which Congress has gained legislative power over Indian
tribes. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“The treaty power does not literally authorize Congress to act legislatively . . . . But . . . treaties made pursuant to that
power can authorize Congress to deal with matters with which otherwise Congress could
not deal.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (describing foreign and international
affairs as “matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the federal government”);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (holding that the federal government has
“full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties”).
The Constitution also explicitly prohibits states from engaging in treaty-making. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
See Monette, supra note 8, at 631 (noting that treaties with tribes represent an “international relationship between two independent sovereigns”).
Perhaps the most famous example of this is the treaty discussed in Worcester v. Georgia, in
which, as described by Chief Justice Marshall, the United States “acknowledge[d] the said
Cherokee nation to be a sovereign nation, authorized [sic] to govern themselves, and all
persons who have settled within their territory, free from any right of legislative interference by the several states composing the United States of America, in reference to acts
done within their own territory.” 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 530 (1832).
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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in the hands of the entity to which the people grant such authority.230
Therefore, treaty federalism constitutionally preempts the exercise of
state power over Indian affairs through the very logic of the treaty relationship. Because the Framers sought to remedy the turbulence
231
that resulted when individual states dealt with Indian tribes, placing
the focus of federal power on the logic of the treaty relationship emphasizes the importance of “harmony and uniformity” in Indian law.
In these ways, treaty federalism squarely supports the idea that
power over Indian affairs is inherently federal and constitutionally
preempted. It provides both an accurate conception of the nature of
the federal-tribal relationship and a legitimate basis for federal power
grounded in constitutional norms of popular sovereignty and federalism. Treaty federalism grounds the federal power over Indian affairs
in a source external to the Constitution itself: treaties that expressly
and impliedly declined to authorize state power over Indian tribes.
Because treaties so fundamentally define the relationship of tribes to
the union, they have taken on a “constitutional” status even though
they are not part of the Constitution itself.
C. Applying Constitutional Preemption to PL-280
In Part I, this Article noted that courts dealing with the constitutionality of PL-280 generally held that either, (1) Congress was enti232
tled to “withdraw” from portions of the field of Indian affairs; or,
(2) Congress could validly delegate its authority over Indian affairs to
233
the states. If the power over Indian affairs is an exclusively federal,
and therefore constitutionally-preempted, power, neither of these
approaches offers plausible constitutional justifications for PL-280.
230

231

232

233

See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141 (“The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws
to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it
cannot pass it over to others.”).
James Madison, the architect of the Indian Commerce Clause, “desired explicitly to prevent state encroachments on the exclusive commitment of power to the federal government to regulate affairs with the Indian tribes.” Clinton, supra note 185, at 1155. Clinton
argues that the Framers, and Madison in particular, responded to rifts between the states
and the federal government that “had brought the nation to the brink of a general Indian war or, at least, serious frontier clashes” in several states. Id. at 1157; see also COHEN,
supra note 69, § 1.02[3], at 24 (describing the tensions between states and tribes during
the confederation period).
See, e.g., Anderson v. Britton, 318 P.2d 291, 300 (Or. 1957) (“[T]he federal government
may withdraw from the field and turn the subject matter back to the states, when it
chooses to do so.”).
See, e.g., State v. Fanning, 759 P.2d 937, 940 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging
the theory “that states possess inherent jurisdiction which lies dormant while federal jurisdiction exists”).
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1. PL-280 as a “Withdrawal” of Federal Power
Accepting that constitutional preemption prohibits a state from
exercising inherently federal powers, it follows that Congress cannot
merely “withdraw” from a field of authority and allow states to take
over. Following from this principle to reach the conclusion that PL280 is unconstitutional requires a more precise definition of “the
power over Indian affairs.”
Treaty federalism, by itself, does not provide a clear answer regarding the precise scope of federal power over Indian tribes. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to determine this scope because a clear constitutional principle can be determined independent of the scope of
federal power. This basic principle is that the Constitution precludes
states from exercising any power over Indians in Indian country, regardless of how much power the Constitution permits the federal
government to exercise.
That this principle is constitutionally sound can be illustrated by
imagining the two extremes of the spectrum of federal power over
tribes. At one extreme, the Constitution authorizes the federal government only to engage with Indian tribes as sovereign governments,
and treaties preserve the relationship on an international plane. Under this view, the states obviously have no power over tribes, because
tribes never came within the purview of the Constitution in the first
place. Thus, the federal government may act pursuant to treaties,
just as it might, for example, construct a military base in a foreign
country with that country’s consent. But, such an agreement does
not permit the federal government to place citizens of that country
under the jurisdiction of a state; such a suggestion would be ludicrous—not because of constitutional preemption, but because the
foreign country is not even within the political scope of the Constitution in the first place.
The second view, which has been adopted by the Supreme Court,
is that Congress has “plenary power” over Indian tribes. This view is
234
Under this
primarily grounded in the Indian Commerce Clause.
view, because Congress has power over every aspect of Indian affairs,
every aspect of Indian affairs should be constitutionally preempted.
This is true for several reasons. As a historical matter, the plenarypower doctrine arose directly from a perceived need to protect tribes

234

See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”)
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from dangers posed by states.235 But more importantly, the very notion of plenary power mandates the constitutional preemption of Indian affairs. After all, how can a power of the kind described in our
Indian law jurisprudence—so “all-encompassing” that tribal sover236
eignty “exists only at the sufferance of Congress” —not be repugnant to a similar power in the states? Naturally, if power over Indian
affairs is constitutionally preempted and power over Indian affairs
means power over everything pertaining to Indian affairs, then the
power over everything pertaining to Indian affairs is constitutionally
preempted.
Treaty federalism suggests that federal power falls somewhere between these two extremes. Federal power over tribes is dictated by
237
the federal nature of the treaty relationship. The scope of federal
power pursuant to a treaty does not affect the scope of state power
over Indian tribes. Whatever power the federal government assumes
under treaty federalism is constitutionally preempted; whatever power it did not assume did not come within the purview of the constitutional polity in the first place, and thereby, cannot be exercised by
states. Thus, if the federal government does not have the power,
then certainly states do not—a point supported by the Apportionment Clause’s exclusion of “Indians not taxed” from state representation, which can be seen as constitutional confirmation that Indians
238
are outside the scope of state jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Constitution precludes states from exercising any
power over Indians in Indian country. This principle remains true regardless of how broadly one defines federal power over Indian affairs.
The word “over” is important because constitutional preemption
should not lead to the conclusion that states are powerless in their relations with tribes. It simply means that the relationship of states to
tribes is one of government-to-government. This principle places
states and tribes on the same “plane” of sovereignty in our federal sys239
Just as states have the constitutional authority to engage in
tem.
235

236
237
238

239

See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (describing how the states became the Indians’ deadliest enemies and that the federal government thus has a duty to
protect the Indians from the states).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319, 323 (1978).
See supra text accompanying notes 212–31.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (amending art. I, § 2); Monette,
supra note 8, at 630 n.83 (explaining that the significance of the Apportionment Clause’s
“Indians not taxed” provision is its “imperative construction that Indians not taxed by the
state are not within the polity of the state, especially not subject to its jurisdiction”).
See Monette, supra note 8, at 619 (arguing that two sovereigns on such a plane would “influence each other through the federal political processes”).
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discussion and agreement with each other, constitutional preemption
does not necessarily preclude states and tribes from engaging one
another.
In this sense, applying constitutional preemption to PL-280 performs a simple task: it gives constitutional status to the consent prin240
One might, as
ciple that forms the basis for popular sovereignty.
suggested by President Eisenhower, view it as morally wrong that
tribes are placed under the authority of states without their con241
sent, but the only apparent mechanism for correcting this situation
is a political one. Congress, imposing an after-the-fact consent requirement into PL-280, appears to have acknowledged the moral
problem with permitting states to exercise power over Indians in In242
Through constitutional
dian country without tribal consent.
preemption, the consent requirement can be protected by judicial
review, rather than a political mechanism.
PL-280 is unconstitutional because it grants states an exclusively
federal authority over Indians in Indian country. But, it would not
necessarily be unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed tribes to
consent to state authority. Under treaty federalism, the federal government is permitted to authorize a government-to-government relationship akin to interstate compacts.
Furthermore, the principle that the Constitution prohibits state
power over Indians in Indian country is a reflection of the specific
powers delegated in PL-280. The principle does not apply to Indians
within state jurisdiction; similarly, it would not prohibit a state from,
for example, taxing income earned by non-Indians on Indian lands.
The boundaries of the general rule might be less clear where a strong
state interest conflicts with the interests of tribal self-government.
The Preemption Doctrine as currently applied in Indian law would
have to be reformulated; courts would have to ask not only whether
state power is preempted by relevant statutes and treaties, but wheth243
The shift would be
er it is preempted by the Constitution itself.
240

241
242
243

See Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 386
(1989) (describing the importance of the principle of “consent of the governed” in Indian law jurisprudence).
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 38, at 1406–07 (“President Eisenhower indicated that the
lack of such a provision left him with grave doubts.” (internal citations omitted)).
Id. (describing how moral outrage led to Congress finally amending PL-280 to require
tribal consent).
Thus, constitutional preemption might be thought of as an extension of the holding in
McClanahan, which held that Indian sovereignty “provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.” McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). Instead of the approach in McClanahan, this Article
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subtle but important. While it may be difficult to apply constitutional
preemption in hard cases, PL-280 is a legislative act that would be
clearly unconstitutional.
2. PL-280 as a “Delegation” of Federal Power
The constitutional preemption doctrine this Article has described
and the Nondelegation Doctrine are closely intertwined–recall that
Knickerbocker and Sharpnack both hinged on the Nondelegation Doc244
The difference between the two is whether states have the
trine.
authority to receive the power in question and whether Congress has
the authority to delegate the power in question. Thus, even if PL-280 is
a delegation, it is invalidated by the doctrine of constitutional
preemption. The principles of the Nondelegation Doctrine, however, help reinforce the conclusion that PL-280 is unconstitutional.
The basis for the idea that the legislature cannot delegate legislative power to another body again arises from Locke, who argued:
“The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people
245
have.” Locke based this argument on the fact that the participants
to the social compact only agreed to “submit to rules, and be gov246
Thus, the
erned by laws made by such men, and in such forms.”
people grant the legislature only the power to make laws, and not to
247
make legislators.
Locke’s point here was merely the result of his original justifications for the social compact. If the legislature can delegate its authority away to other entities, then it would undermine the purpose of en248
tering into a social compact. When a person enters into the social
compact, he or she gives up the right to protect his or her own prop-

244
245
246
247
248

presents a stronger notion of preemption, which goes a step beyond treaties and statutes
to the Constitution itself. Although this Article does not endorse McClanahan’s rejection
of “platonic notions of Indian sovereignty,” id., the idea of preemption plays a part in defining the legal boundaries of state, federal, and tribal authority.
See infra text accompanying notes 167–78.
LOCKE, supra note 89, § 142, at 72.
Id. § 141, at 71.
Id. (explaining that the people are bound only by laws “enacted by those whom they have
chosen and authorized to make laws for them” and not by other men).
In other words, the very purpose of the social compact is to form “a community . . . with
a power to act as one body.” Id. § 96, at 48. If the sovereign begins delegating its powers
back to members of the community, the result is simply a return to the state of nature.
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erty on the condition that all others are giving it up as well.249 If the
legislature gives that power back to one person, or to all of them, the
most basic terms of the social contract have been violated.
Although Locke’s insistence that the sovereign makes laws and
not legislators has been applied in cases to support the argument that
the legislative branch cannot confer authority upon the executive
250
branch, it is equally applicable where the legislature delegates authority upon a state legislature. Popular sovereignty underpins constitutional preemption: the citizens of the states, by entering the union, authorized Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes
251
and authorized the president to make treaties. It is hard to imagine
what theory permits Congress the authority to grant these powers to
252
Like the participants in Locke’s social compact, the
the states.
people of the United States vested in Congress sole legislative power
253
over certain matters. Granting state legislators the authority to ap254
ply criminal and civil laws against a new group of people certainly
falls more under the category of making legislators than of making
255
laws.
Like federalism, which can be seen as a vertical separation of pow256
ers, a horizontal separation of powers is rooted in the Constitution.
249

250

251

252

253
254

255
256

Id. § 97, at 49 (explaining that in forming a government, each man leaves the state of nature to fend for himself and puts himself under an obligation to submit for the determination of the majority).
See, e.g. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power); Indus. Union Dep’t v.
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court
expressly recognized the existence of and the necessity for limits on Congress’ ability to
delegate its authority to representatives of the Executive Branch.”). But see Bank One
Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(using Locke to argue against deriving legislative intent from committee activity).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); U.S. CONST. art. II, §
2, cl. 2 (describing how the president has the power “to make Treaties”).
Congress has, on occasion, delegated power to the states that would otherwise be precluded by the Dormant Commerce Clause. However, those laws can be seen as an act of
Congress “relinquishing” its authority over an area of concurrent jurisdiction, whereas
PL-280 constitutes a positive grant of authority to states that the states otherwise would
not have had.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (granting state law relating to criminal offenses “the same
force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State”); 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (2006) (granting state law relating to civil disputes “the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State”).
LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141, at 71.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very defini-
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Much of the relevant case law on the issue of delegation arises from
questions of separation of powers between the branches of the feder257
al government, not questions of federalism. But, both vertical and
258
horizontal separations of powers serve the same essential purpose,
so there is no reason to think that an unconstitutional congressional
delegation of power made to an administrative agency would be constitutional if it were made to a state legislature. Therefore, it is helpful to examine jurisprudence on the issue of Congress’s ability to delegate power to the executive. To which entity Congress is delegating
power is not as relevant as the fact that Congress delegated away its
259
exclusive powers at all.
The Nondelegation Doctrine is based on the concept that the
Constitution vests “a particular kind and quantity of power in a specif260
ic institution.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States dealt with
a law authorizing trade associations to develop “codes of fair competi261
Holdtion” that would take effect upon approval of the president.
ing the law unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that “Congress is
not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legisla262
tive functions with which it is thus vested.” The Court recognized,
however, that Congress needed some flexibility in allowing others to
263
handle the details that it was incapable of managing. When review-

257

258

259

260
261
262
263

tion of tyranny.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1975) (“The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers:
it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787.”).
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (holding that the presidential
line-item veto violates the separation-of-powers doctrine); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) (explaining that a statutory House of
Representatives veto power violates the separation of powers doctrine).
Madison, for example, argued:
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic] will be derived from and dependent
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little
danger from interested combinations of the majority.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
See, e.g., United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 298 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The vice in the Schechter case was not that the President was the one who received the
delegated authority, but that the Congress had abdicated the lawmaking function. The
result should be the same whether the lawmaking authority, constituted by Congress, is
the President or a State.”).
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002).
295 U.S. 495, 523, 529 (1935).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530 (“[T]he Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function
in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits . . . .”).
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ing such a delegation, the courts “cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is
264
to be maintained.” In the end, the delegation of power in Schechter
was simply too broad: “Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it au265
thorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe them.”
The Nondelegation Doctrine, thus, requires that Congress lay
down “an intelligible principle to which the person or body author266
ized to [act] is directed to conform.” Essentially, if Congress “legislate[s] and indicate[s]” its will, it can then give another body the
267
“power to fill up the details.”
While the Nondelegation Doctrine itself might provide a convincing argument against PL-280, it is more important to us insofar as it
presents another perspective on why constitutional preemption so
clearly applies. Recall that the court in Sharpnack upheld the Assimilative Crimes Act on the grounds that Congress could prospectively
268
Suppose that PL-280 did not grant
“adopt” state law as its own.
states wholesale jurisdiction over Indian tribes, but rather acted only
to incorporate state law as federal law. Such a law could be squared
with Sharpnack in two ways. First, it could be distinguished on the
grounds that the power over federal enclaves simply is not exclusively
federal. But, such an argument seems tenuous, and there is no reason to think that it is any more exclusively federal than the federal
power over Indian affairs. Second, it might be that Sharpnack was
wrongly decided; the doctrine of constitutional preemption, as this
Article has outlined it, would likely preclude state legislation over inherently federal powers, even if the law did not grant wholesale jurisdiction.
PL-280 cannot be justified under Sharpnack because the justification in Sharpnack that Congress can “adopt” state law does not apply
when Congress grants wholesale jurisdiction over a matter. Giving
states legislative jurisdiction, and thus “adopting” state law as federal
law, is fundamentally different than giving states both executive and
judicial power. Even if Congress could prospectively adopt state law,
264
265
266
267
268

Id.
Id. at 541. This distinction, of course, is analogous to Locke’s distinction between “making laws” and “constituting the legislative.” See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141, at 71.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (emphasis omitted).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911) (“[T]he authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power . . . .”).
See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1958) (“Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing
adoption by Congress . . . .”).
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it could not conceivably “adopt” the decision of every state prosecutor, judge, and law enforcement agent that acts pursuant to the powers granted in PL-280. Such an idea is not only absurd as a practical
matter; it is premised on the idea that Congress can make legislative,
executive, and judicial decisions over matters involving Indian affairs.
Therefore, the Nondelegation Doctrine is helpful not because PL-280
should be conceived of as an unconstitutional delegation, but because the doctrine illustrates how PL-280 is something much more
problematic than an unconstitutional delegation. It is a wholesale
grant of federal power to the states in a manner that is inconsistent
with principles of federalism and popular sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined an argument against the constitutionality
of PL-280. PL-280 is only one piece of the Indian law puzzle, but it
clearly demonstrates the need to reinterpret federal Indian law with
our principles of constitutionalism and popular sovereignty. Doing
so will strengthen the quality and integrity of both Indian law and
constitutional law. In conclusion, PL-280 offers two key lessons. First,
it sheds light on the nature of sovereignty and emphasizes that Indian
law will remain in a state of confusion until we come up with a clear
federalism-based solution to the question of Indian sovereignty. Second, it emphasizes the need to continually enforce the boundaries
of American federalism as a means of preserving the sovereignty of
the American people.
Federal Indian law has turned the concept of sovereignty upsidedown. Justice Clarence Thomas best expressed the problem caused
by our current system of Indian-law jurisprudence. In United States v.
Lara, Supreme Court upheld a federal law that affirmed tribal author269
ity to prosecute Indians who were not members of that tribe. The
Court based its reasoning, in part, on the idea of Congressional ple270
nary power. Justice Thomas concurred but attacked the very notion
271
of this type of plenary power. He argued that “the tribes either are
or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases un272
In other words, the
tenably hold both positions simultaneously.”

269
270
271

272

541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree with the Court . . . that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.’” (internal citation omitted)).
Id.
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idea that Congress has unlimited power over tribes is inconsistent
273
with the idea of sovereignty. Thomas went on to argue that “[t]he
Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives
274
Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.” Until the
Court analyzes questions of Congressional power over tribes “honestly
and rigorously, the confusion that [Thomas] identified will continue
275
to haunt our cases.”
Justice Thomas is correct: the position that tribes possess inherent sovereignty is simply inconsistent with the position that Congress
can exercise plenary power over them. PL-280 clearly embodies the
problems of our current system. With the passage of PL-280, Congress passed on the financial and administrative burden of dealing
276
with Indian tribes to states. In doing so, it significantly blurred the
lines between state, tribal, and federal power. This has required serious Supreme Court interpretation on several major occasions, and
even those decisions have proven unsatisfactory to clarify the scope of
277
It is time to clear up some of this confusion by critically
the law.
considering the constitutional validity of PL-280 and taking the necessary action to bring it in line with principles of popular sovereignty.
History has recognized the termination policy on which PL-280
278
was built as a mistake, and the dominant strain of thinking now

273
274
275
276

277

278

Id. at 218 (“It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim
of an external government.”).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 704 (“A notable feature of [PL-280] is the absence of any federal funding support for the states’ new law enforcement and criminal
justice duties.”).
See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (applying the
distinction between criminal and regulatory laws to determine whether Indian gaming is
permissible); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (holding that PL-280 did
not confer taxing jurisdiction over tribes); Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between
Criminal and Regulatory: How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump
Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 481 (2004) (concluding that that the
criminal/regulatory distinction is largely meaningless and unpredictable and that efforts
should be made to clarify and repeal PL-280).
See Michael C. Walch, Terminating The Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181,
1190–92 (1983) (describing the abandonment of the termination policy). Walch notes:
“Official repudiation of the termination policy came in 1969, when President Nixon
called for Indian policy of ‘self-determination without termination.’ According to Nixon,
forced termination was ‘wrong,’ and the goal of Indian policy had to be ‘to strengthen
the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.’” Id. at 1191
(internal citation omitted). Although Nixon signaled the official end to termination, departures from it had begun with the Kennedy Administration, and President Lyndon
Johnson had also specifically called for an end to termination. See Raymond V. Butler,
The Bureau of Indian Affairs: Activities Since 1945, 436 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
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runs in favor of tribal self-government.279 The basic contradiction described by Justice Thomas lies at the heart of the problem, and PL280 is only the most egregious embodiment of that problem. Barsh
and Henderson have offered what may be the best solution in the
form of a constitutional amendment to clarify the state-tribal-federal
280
relationship. We may need a “constitutional moment” to offer considered judgment of the American people on a question that has presented a constitutional quagmire for over a century. This constitutional solution should affirm the status of tribes as units in a federal
system, complete with the constitutional protection of their authority.
It should clarify that states and tribes are co-equal governments and
offer a mechanism for agreements between the two to further cooperative interests. However, it should also encompass all viewpoints
and critically ask the hard questions about state and tribal sovereignty, including what role tribes and tribal members should have in state
governments that may have little power over tribes and tribal mem281
bers.
PL-280 is not only a reflection of the confused theoretical basis of
federal Indian law; it is also a reflection of the struggle to preserve the
boundaries of a federal system. The term “federalism” is often associated with the promotion of state sovereignty, no doubt in reaction
to the fact that the last century of politics has been defined by the
growth of federal power. But federalism is a two-sided coin. Although this Article has advocated certain limitations on state power, a
reasonably applied doctrine of constitutional preemption will have
the long-term effect of strengthening the federal system. A judicial
system unwilling to take seriously the constitutional constraints on
state power built into our federal system is unlikely to take seriously
the reciprocal constraints on federal power. The complete deference
the Court has shown to Congress on Indian law matters—even where
Congress has chosen to delegate away its own power—negatively af-

279

280

281

50, 54–57 (1978); see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412
(1968) (holding that the Termination Act did not extinguish treaty rights).
See Walch, supra note 280, at 1191 (“[F]ederal Indian policy since [Nixon’s] time has followed President Nixon’s call to emphasize the role of tribal governments and the right of
Indians to choose their own destiny.”).
Barsh and Henderson advocate a constitutional resolution that will “clarify the reserved
territorial powers of tribes, rejecting the authority of Congress to arrogate power unilaterally over tribes without denying [the] tribe’s authority to delegate additional powers to
Congress.” Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 280.
In the constitutional amendment proposed by Barsh and Henderson, for example, they
advocate withdrawing the right of Indians to vote in the state political process, arguing
that “no community already largely assimilated into a state or financial dependant on it
will lightly trade its existing franchise for political autonomy.” Id. at 282.

May 2013]

PREEMPTION, PUBLIC LAW 280, AND FEDERALISM

1371

fects the health of a federal system that depends on a judiciary willing
to make difficult judgments about the boundaries of state and federal
power. Therefore, although the Framers primarily feared the aggran282
dizement of congressional power, the reckless delegation of congressional power may be just as dangerous or constitutionally illegiti283
mate because the boundaries of the federal system were put in
place by the sovereign American people, not to be altered by normal
political activity.
The primary purpose of this Article has been to set out the theoretical basis for a doctrine of constitutional preemption and apply
that doctrine to PL-280. In doing so, this Article has argued that PL280 illustrates the need to reinterpret federal Indian law in light of
American constitutional principles of federalism and popular sovereignty. Recognizing the unconstitutionality of PL-280 would be a step
toward clarifying the confused nature of sovereignty that defines federal Indian law, but it would also help strengthen and preserve our
commitment to American federalism.

282

283

Madison argued: “In republican government, the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). David Epstein describes the federalist argument: “Precisely because the legislature seems closest to the people, it is most
dangerous to the people; it sees its closeness as ‘influence’ which it can use in the service
of its own enterprising ambition.” DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
FEDERALIST 132 (1984).
Norman Williams succinctly argued, with regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause, “[i]f
Congress wishes to foster state protectionism, it must do so directly. In only that way can
we rest assured that the responsibility for such action will be laid at Congress’s door.”
Williams, supra note 79, at 238.

